I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court had previously dealt with the circumstances of purportedly insane prisoners on death row,' the Court had never squarely addressed the issue of the constitutional rights of condemned prisoners. In Ford v. Wainwright, 2 the Court held for the first time that the eighth amendment 3 prohibits the execution of insane prisoners. Basing their holding upon the fact that at common law the execution of the insane was clearly prohibited, and the fact that no state currently permits such executions, a plurality of the Court held that prisoners sentenced to death have a constitutional right not to be executed if they are insane at the time of execution. 4 As a result of this holding, the plurality concluded that the Florida procedures for the determination of a prisoner's sanity did not afford Alvin Ford the fair hearing necessary to prevent habeas corpus review in federal court. 5 The recognition of the constitutional rights of insane prisoners in Ford is significant because it requires that state procedures for the determination of sanity and for dealing with allegations of insanity satisfy due process standards. Heretofore, the stay of the execution of an insane prisoner was viewed as an act of mercy by the state, such that the state was required only to provide minimal protections to prisoners alleging that they were insane. Now that insane prisoners have a constitutional right not to be executed, however, states must provide safeguards that comport with this new due process right. Thus, Ford will have a major impact on state procedures for the disposition of insanity claims by condemned prisoners.
While the reasoning of the Court in Ford is straightforward and a logical extension of the Court's recent eighth amendment jurisprudence, there are still three inherent flaws in the decision. First, the Court did not identify the procedures required by due process to protect the new constitutional right that the holding created. Second, the Court gave no indication of what the appropriate test for insanity should be for a condemned prisoner. Finally, the Court failed to specify the rationale for the exemption of insane prisoners from execution. This Note examines these issues and identifies several factors that may assist in the interpretation of existing procedures for the disposition of insanity claims in light of the Court's holding.
II. PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The United States Supreme Court has considered four previous cases involving prisoners who alleged they were mentally incompetent at the time of their scheduled executions. In none of these instances, however, did the Court squarely address the constitutionality of executing the insane.
The Court first addressed an insanity claim by a death row inmate in Nobles v. Georgia 6 in 1897. In Nobles, the Supreme Court was called to resolve the issue of whether a defendant, upon the mere suggestion of present insanity, had a due process right to a full jury trial on the issue of his fitness to be executed. The Court held that the condemned inmate did not have an absolute entitlement to a jury trial and that the procedures of the state of Georgia satisfied the minimal requirements of due process.7 Noting that at common law the rule against the execution of the insane was a matter of judicial discretion, the Court wrote that the manner in which the question of insanity should be resolved was a matter for legislative regulation., The Court refused to recognize a constitutional right 9 not to be exe-8 Id. at 409. 9 In Nobles, the petitioner contended that his right not to be executed was guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. At that time, the eighth amendment was not considered by the Court to apply to the states. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)(extending the eighth amendment's protections to state procedures).
cuted, and specified that its holding addressed only the narrow issue of whether a full jury trial was required to decide a claim of insanity.' 0 The Supreme Court did not hear another case involving an allegedly insane, condemned convict for fifty-three years. In Phyle v. Duffy," the Court granted certiorari to decide the questions of whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment forbade the execution of the insane and whether a person could be executed upon an unreviewable ex parte determination of sanity. Because the petitioner in that case had not exhausted his state remedies, however, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition for habeas corpus and therefore dismissed the writ of certiorari. 12 Nonetheless, Phyle is significant because the Court stated, albeit as dicta, that Nobles did not control the petitioner's contentions. 13 The Court carefully pointed out that Nobles decided a very narrow issue and did not stand for the proposition that a state could constitutionally allow a single individual to make an ex parte determination of sanity without judicial supervision or review.
14 Although the Court in Phyle did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of executing the insane, the Court faced the issue two years later in Solesbee v. Balkcom. 15 In Solesbee, the Court upheld the state of Georgia's procedures for the disposition of condemned prisoners' insanity claims. Georgia's procedure 16 
846
[Vol. 77 health facility with the aid of such experts as he deemed necessary. Although the petitioner argued that the Georgia procedure violated due process because it did not afford the prisoner an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and provide evidence in an adversarial hearing, the Court was not persuaded that the procedure was defective.
The Court noted that the petitioner had not shown any refusal by the Governor to consider information submitted by the petitioner. Thus, Solesbee may have been decided differently had there been a showing that the petitioner was denied an opportunity to be heard. 17 Moreover, like Nobles, the holding in Solesbee warrants only limited emphasis because the Court declined to address the issue of whether the execution of the insane is "cruel and unusual punishment" despite the opportunity to decide the issue. 1 8 Again, the Court explicitly warned that it only intended its ruling to pass upon the specific procedures challenged in the case at bar. 19 Nevertheless, Solesbee does deserve considerable attention because of the strong dissent filed by Justice Frankfurter. Justice Frankfurter argued for the first time that the Constitution prohibits the execution of insane prisoners. 20 Justice Frankfurter thoroughly examined the common law rule against the execution of the insane and pointed out that no state permitted the execution of insane persons. 2 1 As a result, he concluded that an insane convict has a constitutional right not to be executed because the fourteenth amendment protects rights that are "deeply rooted in our common heritage."
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Eight years after Solesbee, the Supreme Court considered another insanity claim by a death row inmate. In Caritativo v. California, 2 3 a condemned prisoner challenged a California law which only permitted a prison warden to take the first step in instituting court proceedings for the determination of a condemned prisoner's sanity. The Court, citing Solesbee, upheld the lower court's approval of By order of the Governor, however, Ford's attorneys were not permitted to cross-examine the psychiatrists or act in any other adversarial capacity. 3 3 The psychiatrists examined Ford simultaneously during a single thirty minute interview. 3 4 Although each produced a different diagnosis, all of the psychiatrists concluded that Ford had "the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him." 3 5 After the psychiatric examinations, Ford's attorneys tried to submit further information to the Governor, including the report of a fourth psychiatrist who had thoroughly examined Ford and found him to be insane. The Governor's office, however, refused to inform Ford's counsel whether the additional psychiatric information would be considered. 37 Subsequently, the Governor signed a death warrant without an explanation or statement of his findings. Ford's counsel sought a competency hearing in state court, but the hearing was denied. 3 9 Ford's attorneys then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, again seeking an evidentiary hearing to determine Ford's mental competency. The court denied the petition without a hearing. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stayed Ford's execution and granted a certificate of probable cause, noting that the Supreme Court had never decided whether the execution of the insane violated the eighth amendment. 4 0 The trists in writing that they are to examine the convicted person to determine whether he understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed upon him. The examination of the convicted person shall take place with all three psychiatrists present at the same time. Counsel for the convicted person and the state attorney may be present at the examination. If the convicted person does not have counsel, the court that imposed the sentence shall appoint counsel to represent him. (2) After receiving the report of the commission, if the Governor decides that the convicted person has the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him, he shall issue a warrant to the warden directing him to execute the sentence at a time designated in the warrant.
Id. (emphasis added).
32 106 S. Ct. at 2599. State of Florida subsequently attempted to have the stay of execution vacated, but the Supreme Court denied the application to vacate the stay.
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The three member panel of the court of appeals then ruled on the constitutionality of the execution of the insane, holding that Ford was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 4 2 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it would have had "considerable difficulty" with the case absent what it felt was the binding authority of Solesbee. 4 3 In a dissenting opinion very similar to the Supreme Court's ultimate holding in Ford, one judge argued that Solesbee no longer had precedential value due to recent changes in the Supreme Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence. 44 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In a seven to two plurality decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the procedures used by the State of Florida violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 45 More significantly, a five-justice majority also found that the execution of insane persons constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the eighth amendment. 
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[Vol. 77 sanity issue 4 9 were inapplicable because they did not involve the eighth amendment. 50 Thus, Justice Marshall found that Ford presented a case of first impression on the eighth amendment issue. 51 Justice Marshall began his analysis of the eighth amendment by pointing out that the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment includes at least those punishments prohibited at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. 5 2 He then set forth the Court's most recent eighth amendment test: that a particular punishment must be evaluated against the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" 53 and must "comport... with the fundamental human dignity that the Amendment protects." 54 Justice Marshall initiated his evaluation of the societal standards pertaining to the rule against the execution of the insane by investigating the common law authority for the rule, 55 much as Justice Frankfurter did in his dissent in Solesbee. Justice Marshall presented the various reasons which have been used to explain the rule: 1) the execution of the insane is an offense against humanity; 56 2) the condemned might be able to think of a reason why he should not be executed were he not insane; 5 7 3) such an execution has no deterrent value because it would not serve as an example to others; 5 8 4) it would offend religious charity to execute someone before he can prepare himself for another world; 5 9 and 5) execution serves no purpose because insanity is punishment in itself. 60 
restriction is recognized in the Constitution ... its enforcement is in no way confined to the rudimentary process deemed adequate in ages past." 6 6 Thus, Justice Marshall, who was joined in the final sections of the opinion by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, turned to the question of whether the Florida procedures for the determination of the competency of condemned prisoners fulfilled the due process required to protect a constitutional right.
Justice Marshall first found that Alvin Ford was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court because the requirements of the federal habeas corpus statute, 6 7 as defined by the Court's ruling in Townsend v. Sain, 68 had not been met. 6 9 In Townsend, the Court held that "a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts." ' 70 Because the Florida proceeding did not involve the participation of any state court, which is required by the federal statute, 7 '
Justice Marshall held that Ford was entitled to a de novo hearing on the issue of his sanity.
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Moreover, Justice Marshall examined whether Florida's procedure provided the reliability required by Townsend and the federal statute 73 to avoid a federal evidentiary hearing in all cases involving the Florida procedure. Justice Marshall found that Florida's procedures were inadequate in three areas. First, the procedure failed to allow the condemned prisoner to participate in the investigation of his insanity. Specifically, Justice Marshall found the procedure to be inadequate because Alvin Ford and his attorneys were not permitted fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance .. " to submit information concerning his purported insanity. 74 Second, Justice Marshall found that Florida's procedure denied the prisoner an opportunity to cross-examine the psychiatric panel appointed by the state. 7 5 Finally, Justice Marshall found that the Florida procedure was inadequate because it rested the determination of the prisoner's insanity solely on an unreviewable decision by a member of the same governmental branch that prosecuted the prisoner. Although Justice Marshall clearly pointed out the problems with the Florida procedure, he declined to identify a specific procedure that would satisfy the requirements of due process. Justice Marshall did suggest that states look for analogies in their own procedures for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial or for determining whether a defendant can be involuntarily commited to a mental health institution. 7 7 In addition, Justice Marshall noted that some high threshold showing on behalf of the prisoner may be required to weed out nonmeritorious or repetitive claims of insanity. 78 Finally, Justice Marshall added that he did not intend to suggest that a full trial on the insanity issue would be the only way to satisfy due process. 7 9 Thus, Justice Marshall left the burden on the states to develop constitutional procedures for handling the insanity claims of death row inmates.
B.
CONCURRING OPINION Justice Powell agreed that the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of the insane. Because he disagreed with Justice Marshall's view of the required procedures for the disposition of insanity claims, however, and felt that the issue of a standard for determining insanity should have been addressed by the Court, Justice Powell wrote a separate concurrence. [Vol. 77
Justice Powell first addressed the issue of the level of competency required before a prisoner could be executed. He stated that the first justification for the rule exempting insane prisoners from execution, that the prisoner's insanity might prevent him from making arguments to defend himself, has little merit today 8 l in light of modern requirements for the effective assistance of counsel 8 2 and the requirement that a defendant be mentally competent at the time of trial. 8 3 Justice Powell, however, did find merit in the argument that the execution of an insane person is inherently cruel because it prevents him from mentally preparing for his death. He also stated that such an execution interferes with the penal purpose of retribution since an insane person cannot comprehend the reason for his execution. 8 4 Thus,Justice Powell argued that the proper test of sanity in connection with the retributive purpose of criminal law is a test of whether the defendant can understand the connection between his punishment and his crime. After reiterating the same argument set forth by Justice Marshall as to the due process requirements of Townsend and the federal habeas corpus statute, 8 6 Justice Powell discussed the type of hearing that he felt due process requires. Noting that the eighth amendment issue arises only after a prisoner has been convicted and sentenced, Justice Powell argued that the heightened due process procedures required at trials and sentencing proceedings do not apply to the case of insanity pleas by condemned prisoners, especially since the issue is merely when, rather than if, the prisoner is to be executed. 8 7 As a result, Justice Powell reasoned that the burden should be on the petitioner, as it was at common law, 8 (1984) . Justice Powell remarked that because the prisoner has an assurance of effective counsel and the right of appeal, the common law concern that a prisoner will be wrongly executed is very minimal today. 106 S. Ct. at 2607-08 (Powell, J., concurring).
83 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). Justice Powell apparently believes that since a prisoner has a constitutional guarantee that he will not be tried if insane, his concern that he be able to assist in his own defense is already met. 106 S. Ct. at 2608 (Powell, J., concurring). 86 Justice Powell stated that Florida's procedure was inadequate because no determination by a court was required, information submitted by prisoners was not heard, and the determination of sanity was made solely upon the examination of state appointed psychiatrists. Id. at 2609 (Powell, J., concurring). 87 Id. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring). 88 The Court in Nobles stated the common law rule that "'[e]very person of the age a rebuttable presumption of sanity. 8 9 Thus, Justice Powell concluded that a proceeding that is less formal than a trial would satisfy due process concerns. 9 0 He would merely require that a state provide an impartial board or administrator to hear evidence and argument from the prisoner or his counsel. 9 1 C.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION Contrary to the opinions of Justices Powell and Marshall, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White, concluded that the eighth amendment does not prohibit the execution of the insane. 92 Justices O'Connor and White concurred in the judgment of the Court because they felt that the Florida statute, 93 mandating that a prisoner must be transferred to a mental health facility upon being found to be insane, created an entitlement not to be executed while insane. 94 In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that the Florida procedure violated due process because it did not afford the prisoner his fundamental right to be heard. 
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The possibility for indefinite delay is great because no determination can ever be conclusive, since the issue is present insanity. Justice O'Connor would argue that the oral argument nor cross-examination are necessary for a fair hearing. 9 7 In fact, Justice O'Connor would require that the decisionmaker consider only the written submissions on behalf of the prisoner. 98 Thus, Justice O'Connor argued that "the Due Process Clause imposes few requirements on the States in this context." 9 9
D. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, agreed with Justice O'Connor that due process requires only minimal protections for condemned prisoners. Justice Rehnquist and ChiefJustice Burger dissented from the judgment of the Court, however, because they believed that insane prisoners have no constitutional right to a stay of execution. 1 0 0 Justice Rehnquist argued that the eighth amendment does not confer any rights upon condemned prisoners alleging present insanity. He criticized the Court's reliance on what he considered a selective common law precedent, and stated that at common law the decision whether to execute a prisoner purporting to be insane was vested solely in the executive branch. 10 1
Justice Rehnquist suggested that Solesbee should control the issue and militate against the adoption of an eighth amendment right, particularly because the states' approach to determining condemned prisoners' sanity has not changed since Solesbee. 102 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that Florida law created a right not to be executed while insane, arguing instead that Florida's statutory procedure only created a right to inform the Governor that the prisoner may be insane. 103 Id. (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist evidently believes that the expectation that the Governor will hear a prisoner's claim is not the same as an expectation that he will not be executed if insane. Nevertheless, if the prisoner is in fact insane (in the mind of the Governor), the Florida statute requires that the Governor "shall have him committed to a Department of Corrections mental health treatment facility." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985)(emphasis added). Thus, an expectation that the Governor will hear a claim of insanity is really equivalent to an expectation that an insane prisoner will not be executed because if the prisoner is in fact insane, the Governor cannot order his execution.
that the Court's new constitutional right created, 1 0 4 ultimately concluding that it was unnecessary to create a constitutional prohibition against the execution of the insane because no state permitted such an execution anyway.
V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A.
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The specific holding in Ford, that the petitioner was entitled to a de novo evidentiary hearing in federal court, is well-grounded. Even Justices O'Connor and White, who argued that insane prisoners do not have an eighth amendment right to a stay of execution, agreed with Justice Marshall and the majority that Florida's procedures did not give Alvin Ford a "full and fair hearing." 10 5
Moreover, the majority's holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of the insane seems quite logical.' 06 Justice Marshall's opinion correctly identified the two major factors of eighth amendment analysis that the Court has considered in recent years: basic human dignity and contemporary standards of decency. 1 0 7 The unanimous acceptance of the rule against the execution of the insane by American courts and legislatures demonstrates that the rule comports with our society's view of human dignity.' 105 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 106 Ford's counsel also argued that the execution of the insane violates the eighth amendment because it is excessive and serves no penological justification. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). The argument contends that the only acceptable penological justifications are retribution and deterrence, neither of which are served by the execution of the insane. While it seems clear that the goal of retribution is frustrated by the execution of the insane, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 61, at 434-40; Hazard & Louisell, supra note 61, at 386-87, it can also be argued persuasively that Coke's view, that execution of the insane has no deterrent value, is wrong. If one accepts the view that the death penalty in general has a deterrent value, then the execution of the insane would appear to have as much, or even more value, because it would be clear that not even insanity would prevent those convicted of capital crimes from receiving the punishment of death.
107 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. ments considered cruel and unusual at common law are forbidden by the eighth amendment."1 0 In short, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence supports the majority's eighth amendment analysis. Even Justice Rehnquist in dissent could summon no better criticism of Justice Marshall's logic than the argument that it is "unnecessary" to recognize a constitutional right not to be executed because the rule is already uniformly accepted." ' Prior to Ford, the Supreme Court had never before reached the issue of whether the execution of insane persons is "cruel and unusual punishment." Viewing the Court's previous cases in their most limited sense, these cases hold only that if a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be spared from execution, he does not have a right to a full jury trial upon a mere suggestion of insanity, and his sanity can be determined exparte by either a governor or an administrative official. Thus, in one sense the holding in Ford is consistent with the Court's prior decisions because those cases were decided upon a premise that an insane prisoner had no constitutional right to a stay of execution.
Nevertheless, the constitutional holding in Ford makes the Court's previous cases somewhat obsolete. Due to the Court's eighth amendment ruling, state procedures for dealing with claims of insanity must now provide a much higher level of protection than in the past, because, as Justice Frankfurter stated, " [I] n determining what procedural safeguards a State must provide, it makes all the difference in the world whether the United States Constitution places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life of an insane man." 1 12 Even so, the reasoning in the Supreme Court's prior opinions may still be of assistance in analyzing the issue of the procedures that a state must employ in order to protect the rights of condemned persons in its penal system. shall conceded this point.113 Nonetheless, what proceedings are required by due process is unclear after the Court's decision in Ford.
Justice Marshall apparently draws the line at requiring some sort of adversary hearing, as unrestricted as possible, where the prisoner would have the opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim.
1 4 Justice Powell, on the other hand, would merely require that an impartial decisionmaker hear the claims of the prisoner. Justice O'Connor would mandate only that the prisoner's submissions be considered. Thus, there seems to be a large area of disagreement among the members of the Court over the type of procedural safeguards that must be provided to a condemned inmate who makes a claim of mental incompetency.
Another instructive view of the procedures required by due process can be gleaned from the opinions of Justice Frankfurter, who was the first Supreme Court Justice to argue that the Constitution forbids the execution of the insane. Even thoughJustice Frankfurter strongly supported the rights of allegedly insane death row inmates, he would apparently not require a full trial or even a judicial proceeding on the issue of present sanity.'" 5 Based upon his dissent in Solesbee, Justice Frankfurter would apparently agree with the view now held by Justices Powell and O'Connor, that lesser safeguards are required because the determination of sanity after sentencing "does not go to the question of guilt but to its consequences." ' " 16 Thus, Justice Frankfurter suggested that an in camera proceeding would satisfy due process requirements.
Still, Justice Frankfurter would require an opportunity for the prisoner to be heard."1 7 He would mandate that the prisoner be given the opportunity through counsel or next of kin to invoke the protections of due process. He apparently would not support the governor as the decisionmaker and receiver of evidence because of 113 106 S. Ct. at 2605-06 ("We do not here suggest that only a full trial on the issue of sanity will suffice to protect the federal interests."). 114 Id. at 2605. Justice Powell evidently believes thatJustice Marshall would require a "full-scale 'sanity trial.' " 106 S. Ct. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring).
115 See Caritativo, 357 U.S. at 557 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)("I make no claim that the Due Process Clause requires an opportunity to persons in the place of petitioners to have their claim tested in a judicial proceeding."); Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Since it does not go to the question of guilt but to its consequences, the determination of the issue of insanity after sentence does not require the safeguards of a judicial proceeding."). 116 Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 117 "[Tlhe minimum assurance that the life-and-death guess will be a truly informed guess requires respect for the basic ingredient of due process, namely, an opportunity to be allowed to substantiate a claim before it is rejected." Id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 77 common law procedures are no longer adequate. At common law, no uniform procedure existed for handling claims of insanity by a condemned prisoner. Rather, the trial judge had the discretion to employ whatever procedures he felt were required under the circumstances. 22 Today, a condemned prisoner has a right to greater assurance than this. In order to provide these assurances, every state must develop four specific sets of procedures.
First, the state must establish a procedure for raising a claim of insanity. 123 Some states allow anyone to raise the issue of insanity, while others allow only a warden or sheriff keeping the inmate in custody to raise the issue.1 24 For a prisoner's first claim of incompetency, at least, he should be permitted one hearing as a matter of right.
Second, a specific type of hearing for dealing with a properly raised claim of insanity should be identified. The prisoner must be given the opportunity to be heard and his evidence must be received by the decision making authority. A full trial is not required, however, because this hearing does not involve a question of guilt or innocence. Moreover, a jury is unnecessary because expert testimony will probably be dispositive, especially considering that juries are likely to accept the judgments of court-appointed experts. The decisionmaker should not be the governor 12 6 because of his potential for bias.1 2 7 An impartial authority that would hear evidence supplied by a panel of experts would probably suffice. 128 In addition, the prisoner through counsel should have the opportunity to challenge the findings of the state experts.
Third, the state must designate a procedure for the disposition of repeated claims of insanity. As Justice Marshall alluded to, a rea- [Vol. 77 sonable threshold must be employed to weed out nonmeritorious claims. Expedited review after an initial full hearing may be a good alternative.129 However, because the issue involved here is present incompetency, the prisoner must not be dismissed without a thorough reevaluation of his case, even though this may cause administrative burdens.°3 0 Thus, a high threshold requirement for a hearing may be necessary since successive hearings cannot be rudimentary. Finally, the state must develop a procedure to determine when a prisoner has returned to sanity. While this issue has receive little attention, it is significant because the determination that a prisoner has regained his sanity means that he is again condemned to die. Rather than an act of mercy, the finding that a condemned prisoner is sane actually represents his death warrant. Moreover, the procedures for determining whether a prisoner has regained his sanity should be more stringent than for the initial determination of mental competency, because in the former case the prisoner is examined against a background of a legal insanity, while in the latter case the prisoner's background is that he was already found competent to be tried and sentenced. Therefore, neither an expedited hearing nor a procedure leaving the sanity decision solely to a hospital administrator would adequately protect the prisoner's due process rights.
C. THE TEST OF INSANITY
The test of insanity used to determine whether a prisoner is fit to be executed is a crucial element in the procedures discussed above. The generally accepted common law test for insanity is whether the defendant is aware of his conviction and his impending execution,' 3 ' although it has also been forumulated as a question of whether the condemned has the "present mental competency to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment to be executed upon him."' 3 2 No matter which test represents the common law view, however, it seems clear that there must be a more explicit ar-129 See supra text accompanying note 77. 130 The Court in Nobles was also hesitant to recognize a right to a jury trial because it felt that "[i]f the right of trial by jury exist at all, it must exist at all times, no matter how often the plea is repeated alleging insanity occurring since the last verdict. such a test would satisfy the retributive goal of punishment and allow the prisoner to prepare himself for his death. One pair of commentators has suggested that the appropriate test should be the same as that used for involuntary commitment to a mental institution, 13 7 because this test is relatively easy to use and familiar to judges and psychiatrists. 13 Whatever test is adopted by a state, it must be in accord with the purpose of the rule against the execution of the insane.
D. THE LOGIC OF THE RULE
The Supreme Court committed a major error in Ford by not explicitly identifying the accepted justification for the rule against the execution of the insane. Although Justice Marshall stated that the rule applies as much today as it did at common law, he did not examine the logical force of the proposed justifications for the rule, all but one of which are somewhat dubious. For example, the argument that executing an insane person has no deterrent value is questionable because those who supposedly would be deterred by the death penalty could not envision themselves becoming insane after being tried and sentenced. 13 9 In fact, the knowledge that even insanity will not prevent one who commits a capital offense from suffering execution might increase the in terrorem effect of the death penalty. 140 Similarly, the reasoning that executing an insane person violates humanity is also flawed. Justice Traynor, of the California Supreme Court, stated his dissatisfaction with this rationale in his concurrence in the lower court remand of Phyle v. Duly: 14 1 Is it not an inverted humanitarianism that deplores as barbarous the capital punishment of those who have become insane after trial and conviction, but accepts the capital punishment for sane men, a curious reasoning that would free a man from capital punishment only if he is 137 The commentators would use this test, rather than one tailored to an accepted justification for the rule against the execution of the insane, because they concluded that the only acceptable explanation for the rule is that it avoids the unnecessary taking of life. Hazard & Louisell, supra note 61, at 395. 138 The commentators pointed out that this test keeps the investigation "in the realm of medical discourse" rather than involving psychiatrists in the interpretation of legal standards. Id 139 Id. at 385. Because the offender cannot foresee that he will become insane, "he neither supposes he will not be caught or is indifferent to the consequences if he is. Hence, it does not materially dilute the deterrent effect of the death penalty to withhold it if the prisoner becomes insane. Moreover, staying the execution of an insane death row inmate because insanity itself is sufficient punishment, ignores the reality that he will be executed as soon as he returns to sanity.1
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In short, the rule against the execution of the insane can be plausibly justified only by accepting that the execution of an insane person has less retributive value than the execution of a person who is fully aware of the fate he faces. 14 4 If retribution provides an acceptable reason for imposing capital punishment, the rule adopted by the Court makes sense. Otherwise, the rule against the execution of the presently insane only makes the death penalty appear to be arbitrary and capricious. The lack of an accepted justification for the rule, at a minimum, causes significant problems because it makes the determination of the appropriate test of supervening insanity a difficult, if not futile, task.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the reasoning of the plurality in Ford v. Wainwright makes sense in light of the Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the eighth amendment, the decision is deficient in three ways. The Court neglected to identify what procedures states must use for dealing with the insanity claims of condemned prisoners. Moreover, the Court failed to identify a test of mental fitness to be executed. Finally, the Court erred by not specifying which rationale it accepted for the rule against the execution of the insane. Nonetheless, the holding at least begins to safeguard the rights of prisoners who until now were dependent upon the mercy of the state.
